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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the debate on segment reporting standards in the UK and Europe and, 
specifically, the merit of IFRS 8 relative to predecessor standards (SSAP 25 and IAS 14R). We carry 
out a longitudinal analysis of segment reporting practices of a large sample of listed UK companies, 
covering all three reporting regimes. Using the Proprietary Cost Theory (PCT) as our theoretical lens, 
we present evidence consistent with PCT, that proprietary costs considerations influence companies’ 
segment disclosure choices. We show that when companies are required to disclose more detailed 
accounting information for geographical segments (e.g., when geography is the basis of operating 
segments, under IFRS 8, or primary segments, under IAS 14R), they choose to define geographical 
segments in broader geographic areas terms than was the case under SSAP 25. We find that although 
companies disclose greater quantity of segmental information under IFRS 8 and IAS 14R (than SSAP 
25), the more recent standards brought about a notable reduction in (i) the level of specificity of the 
disclosed geographical segments, and (ii) the quantity of disclosed geographic segment profit data – 
one of the most important data types for users. While this may have reduced the proprietary costs of 
segment disclosures, the reduction in disclosure of segmental performance data may have reduced the 
usefulness of segment reports to investors. 
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Segment reporting: Is IFRS 8 really better? 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the segment reporting regime for most listed European firms has changed. More 
specifically in the UK listed companies, standards changed twice: in 2005, when the International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 14R replaced the Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) 25, 
and in 2009, when the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8 superseded IAS 14R. In this 
study we carry out a longitudinal analysis of the impact of these successive changes in segment 
reporting rules on segment disclosures of UK public companies. We examine the impact of these 
changes in segment reporting rules on the amount and types of segmental information disclosed by 
companies. Our analysis is based on a balanced sample of the 127 largest listed non-financial UK 
companies over the period from 2002 to 2010, which covers all three reporting regimes, and allows 
comparative analysis of segmental disclosures by the same sample of companies under the three 
standards. 
 
The primary motivation of this study is to contribute to the debate on the merit of the latest standard, 
IFRS 8, offering evidence to inform policy making. The adoption of IFRS 8 was driven by the 
convergence agenda between US Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) and IFRS (IFRS 
8, para IN 2). IFRS 8 is nearly identical to SFAS 131, with only minor differences and changes 
necessary to make the terminology consistent with IFRS (Crawford, Ferguson, Helliar, and Power, 
2014). A highly politicised debate and power struggle between the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) and the European Union surrounded the standard setting process of IFRS 8 (Veron, 2007; 
Crawford et al., 2014). The EU was concerned that IFRS 8 would bring an alien US standard, SFAS 
131, into EU law (Nichols, Street, and Cereola, 2012). The EU also viewed controversial the standard’s 
use of the management approach to segment identification and reporting, which would allow the use of 
non-IFRS measures (Veron, 2007). Concerns were also raised in that IFRS 8 would impair the reliability 
and comparability of segmental information relative to that of IAS 14R (Veron, 2007). Sukhraj (2007) 
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comments that investors expressed considerable concern about the leeway given to managers in 
choosing what aspects of the business to report, and were “…perturbed by the removal of geographic 
segmentation, which they deem is important to them”.1 IFRS 8 was adopted by IASB in 2006, and 
endorsed for all EU countries in 2007, despite concerns among various users in Europe. 
 
Because of these concerns, the European Parliament required the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) to carry out a post-implementation review (PIR) of IFRS 8. The PIR was completed in 
July 2013, and concluded that while preparers generally think that the Standard works well, investors’ 
views were mixed (IASB, 2013). In particular, the PIR highlights that “investors are wary of a 
segmentation process that is based on the management perspective [and] … mistrust management’s 
intentions and sometimes think that segments are reported in such a way as to obscure the entity’s true 
management structure (often as a result of concerns about commercial sensitivity) or to mask loss-
making activities within individual segments” (IASB, 2013, p. 5). Among other issues revealed by the 
PIR are IFRS 8’s enforcement costs, segment aggregation criteria, and the number and type of line 
items disclosed (Moldovan, 2014). 
 
While the literature on the implementation of IFRS 8 is growing, as summarised in the PIR (IASB, 
2013), only Crawford et al. (2012) provide large-sample evidence of the impact of IFRS 8 on segment 
reporting in the UK. However, given the timing of Crawford, Extance, Helliar, and Power’s (2012) 
study, they could only adopt a short-term framework and only consider the transition period, covering 
the last year of IAS 14R and the first year of IFRS 8. Crawford et al.’s (2012, p. 8) call to extend the 
review of the impact of IFRS 8 by using a longer time span than just one-year pre vs. one-year post 
analysis. Our study contributes to the literature by responding to this call for further research. Clearly, 
the merit of IFRS 8 can be better understood by considering it within its historical context, by comparing 
it with both IAS 14R and SSAP 25.  
 
We seek to uncover changes in qualitative and quantitative features of disclosed segmental information, 
by answering the following research questions: To what extent did each successive standard affect (1) 
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the number and types of reported segments; (2) the way geographic areas are defined and reported; and 
(3) the volume and nature of accounting information disclosed in segment reports? 
 
This study contributes to the extant literature on financial disclosures in several ways. First, unlike prior 
studies, we evaluate the merits of IFRS 8 relative to all of its predecessors in the UK (SSAP 25 and IAS 
14R). We do so by comparing important qualitative and quantitative features of the segmental 
information actually disclosed by the UK companies under each standard. These standards differ 
fundamentally in a number of ways, including how reportable segments are to be identified, what 
accounting line item information is to be disclosed for specific types of reportable segments, and 
whether segmental amounts are required to conform with the basis of preparation and reporting of the 
entity’s financial statement. The advantage of analysing disclosure under three standards over a long 
timescale lies in its potential to uncover new phenomena that a study of single reporting regime may 
not be able to reveal. 
 
Second, we explicitly consider in the analysis how companies responded to or interpreted IFRS 8’s 
entity-wide information disclosure requirement, an aspect that has not been explicitly addressed by 
studies summarised in the PIR. We show that it is important to distinguish between broad (operating 
segments and entity-wide) and narrow (operating segments only) interpretation of geographic and 
business information disclosed in segmental reports under IFRS 8, because this would affect 
conclusions about the merit of IFRS 8 relative to IAS 14R and SSAP 25. 
 
Third, we deploy the Proprietary Cost Theory (PCT) as our theoretical lens to evaluate and interpret 
some of our important findings. Extant segment disclosure literature uses PCT to theorise 
management’s segmental disclosure incentives, and documents empirical evidence consistent with PCT 
(e.g., Harris, 1998; Leuz, 2004; Ettredge, Kwon, Smith, and Stone, 2006; Berger and Hann, 2007). 
Proprietary costs are regarded as an important cost of segmental disclosure regulations (Leuz, 2004). 
We show the proprietary cost incentives are at play in the UK in a similar vein, as they are shown to be 
in non-UK segment disclosure literature. However, while in non-UK literature the proprietary cost 
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argument has been mainly applied when analysing companies’ line-of-business segment disclosures, 
our study highlights the relevance of the proprietary cost argument to companies’ geographic 
information disclosure choices.    
 
One of our most revealing findings is that when companies are required to disclose more detailed 
accounting information for geographical segments (e.g., when they designate geography as their 
operating segments, under IFRS 8, or primary segments, under IAS 14R), the geographical segments 
tend to be defined in terms of broader geographic areas. Similarly, the geographic segments reported as 
operating and primary segments under IFRS 8 and IAS 14R, tend to be defined as broader geographical 
areas than were geographic segments disclosed by the same companies under SSAP 25. Such evidence 
is consistent with predictions from PCT, with companies reducing proprietary costs associated with 
disclosure of commercially sensitive information (e.g., profitability of operations in specific geographic 
countries) by disclosing more broadly-defined geographic areas. We also show that the vast majority of 
our sample companies (77%) choose business rather than geography as their primary (operating) 
segments under IAS 14R (IFRS8). Given the substantially more onerous disclosure requirements of 
accounting information for the primary/operating segments, the prevalence of this choice by companies 
corroborates our conclusion that geographical information is proprietary cost laden. These findings 
complement prior literature on the impact of competitive disadvantage on managers’ business segment 
reporting choices (Harris, 1998; Botosan and Stanford, 2005) by revealing similar behaviour in relation 
to geographic segment reporting choices.  
 
We also find that while IAS 14R and IFRS 8 surpass SSAP 25 in terms of the overall quantity of 
accounting information disclosed in companies’ segment reports, a significantly lower quantity of 
segmental profit information − arguably the most important accounting information type for investors 
− was disclosed under IAS 14R and IFRS 8, for both line-of-business (LOB) and, even more 
significantly, geographic segments. Furthermore, IFRS 8 resulted in a major decline in the average 
number of reported segments when the operating segments are LOB, but more notably so when the 
operating segments are geographic. These findings speak to the concerns expressed by users who 
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viewed the potential reduction of geographic data as one of the main problem areas of IFRS 8 (IASB, 
2013, p. 10). 
 
Overall, we conclude that despite the possible benefits associated with (i) the increased quantity of 
information disclosed under IFRS 8, and (ii) the fact that IFRS 8 allows investors to see companies 
through the eyes of management, SSAP 25 would arguably better serve investors’ needs for geographic 
information. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews segment reporting standards and discusses the 
prior relevant research. Section 3 outlines key research questions. Section 4 describes the sample and 
our approach to analysis. Section 5 discusses the results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background and prior research on segment reporting standards 
Academic- and practitioner-oriented research is replete with evidence that corporate segment 
information is vitally important to financial statements users and investors alike. According to the 
Association of Investment Management and Research’s (AIMR, 1993) study of US analysts, and PwC’s 
(2007) survey of analysts in a number of major capital markets, financial analysts regard segment 
information as indispensable to investment analysis. Similarly, the European analysts’ group, as cited 
by Street and Nichols (2002), argues that segment reporting enables users to better understand an 
enterprise’s past performance, and facilitates judgements about the enterprise as a whole, including 
better assessing risks and prospects.2 
 
To address users’ demand for quality segment information, accounting standard setters and regulators 
around the world have been introducing and updating segment reporting standards. In the UK, the 
London Stock Exchange has since 1965 required listed firms to disclose some limited segment-level 
information, e.g., turnover and profits by line-of-business (LOB).3 More detailed requirements emerged 
under the 1981 Companies Act, which required companies to disclose turnover by class of business and 
geographic market for ‘material’ segments. Although the Act stated that reportable segments should be 
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“substantially different from each other”, it provided little guidance as to what would constitute a 
reportable business or geographic segment, leaving this to the discretion of firms’ directors. 
 
SSAP 25 
The first segment reporting standard in the UK, SSAP 25, was issued in June 1990, by the UK 
Accounting Standards Committee. Its objective was to increase the volume of segment disclosure and 
bring more clarity and consistency to the segment reporting practices of UK firms. The standard 
established a framework for segment identification and reporting whereby segments had to be 
determined on the basis of differences in returns on investments, degrees of risk, growth rates and future 
potential. SSAP 25 was prescriptive and required disclosure of geographic and business types of 
segments, for which essentially the same set of accounting line item information (i.e., turnover, profit 
before taxation and net assets for each reported segment, and reconciliations of segmental amounts to 
consolidated totals) had to be disclosed. A 10% materiality rule applied, with segments having to be 
disclosed if they accounted for more than 10% of company sales, profits or assets.  
 
SSAP 25 was very similar to its international contemporaries, IAS 14 (the first segment reporting 
standard issued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) in 1981) and SFAS 14 
(the first US segment reporting standard issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
in 1976), as all three standards required reporting of geographic and business segments and disclosure 
of segment revenues, profits and assets for each reportable segment.4 
 
While SSAP 25 was considered a step towards more comprehensive and systematic disclosure, it was 
criticised by academic writers (e.g., Emmanuel and Garrod, 1992) for lacking clear-cut guidance in 
defining, identifying and presenting segment information, and the latitude in language which allowed 
for multiple interpretations. Prior research documents mixed evidence as to whether the introduction of 
SSAP 25 led to improvements in the segment disclosure practices of UK firms. Several studies find that 
the adoption of SSAP 25 was associated with changes in reporting patterns and volume of disclosure 
(e.g., Emmanuel, Garrod, McCallum, and Rennie, 1999; Emmanuel and Garrod, 1999, 2002). 
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Emmanuel et al. (1999) report that the introduction of the standard led to an increase in the volume of 
disclosure, notably information on net assets, but that over time growing familiarity with the standard 
led to a subsequent decline in the level of detail of disclosures, particularly with regard to geographic 
segments. Companies were found to be particularly sensitive to providing return information for small 
segments, as this might provide commercially sensitive return information on single investment 
projects. They conclude that the 10% materiality rule was mainly used to identify fewer but larger 
segments, contrary to the intention of the standard. They emphasise and critique the ambiguity in the 
wording of the standard, as it is not clear whether directors should select any one of the criteria – 
turnover, results or net assets – in applying the 10% rule to identify reportable segments, or whether 
companies are at liberty to only disclose segments exceeding the 10% threshold based on all three 
criteria. 
 
Substantial criticism was also levelled against IAS 14 and SFAS 14 (AIMR, 1993; McConnell and 
Pacter, 1995; Harris, 1998; Street, Nichols, and Gray, 2000; Street and Nichols, 2002; Botosan and 
Stanford, 2005; Nichols and Street, 2007). Much like SSAP 25, these standards were criticised for the 
lack of clear guidance in defining reportable segment, allowing managers to aggregate segments in a 
way that could conceal sensitive proprietary information. They were also criticised for requiring 
insufficient data items for each segment, and the fact that the reported segments may not reflect the 
entity’s internal organisation and reporting.  
 
IAS 14R 
In response to the above criticism and the calls of user groups for higher-quality segmental information, 
in 1997 the International Accounting Standards Committee issued IAS 14R as a substantial revision of 
the original IAS 14, introduced in 1981. Similarly, in 1997 the US Financial Accounting Standards 
Board issued a new standard, SFAS 131, which replaced SFAS 14.5 No changes were made to segment 
reporting rules in the UK at that time. However, in 2005, IFRS became compulsory for UK listed 
companies, and as a result IAS 14R replaced SSAP 25 as the appropriate segment reporting standard 
for listed UK companies. 
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IAS 14R introduced two-tier segmentation, where two sets of segments, primary and secondary, had to 
be identified and reported. If the primary basis of segmentation was line-of-business, the secondary 
segments had to be geographic, and vice versa. Substantially more accounting data had to be disclosed 
for primary than for secondary segments. IAS 14R (para. 27) requires segments to be identified based 
on the entity’s internal organisational and management structure and its system of internal financial 
reporting to key management personnel. A brief summary of the key features of SSAP 25, IAS 14R and 
IFRS 8 is provided in the Appendix. 
 
No prior study has assessed the impact of the transition from SSAP 25 to IAS 14R on segment reporting 
in the UK. Our research addresses this void. However, as SSAP 25 is very similar to IAS 14, a brief 
review of prior literature on the transition from IAS 14 to IAS 14R may be appropriate. Street and 
Nichols (2002) examine its impact for a global sample of companies that report under IAS and find that 
IAS 14R resulted in a significant increase in the number of items of information disclosed for each 
primary and secondary segment, and a decline in the number of companies claiming to operate in a 
single line-of-business. However, in geographic segment reporting, many companies continue to utilise 
the broad, vague geographic groupings for which the original version of IAS 14 was often criticised. 
Prather-Kinsey and Meek (2004) also study the impact of the transition to IAS 14R and find that it 
resulted in no loss of information disclosed for LOB and geographic segments. They find no evidence 
of a decrease in the disclosure of segmental earnings, even though IAS 14R no longer required it for 
secondary segments. They also find that IAS 14R marginally increased the number of LOB and 
geographic segments, and that more information was disclosed, especially for LOB segments. 
 
IFRS 8 
In 2006, the IASB issued a new segment reporting standard, IFRS 8, which became effective in 2009, 
replacing IAS 14R. IFRS 8 adopted the management approach, requiring companies to disclose 
operating segments as used for internal reporting and decision making by the chief operating decision 
maker (CODM), thus allowing the use of non-IFRS measures. The standard also requires disclosure of 
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additional entity-wide information on the entity’s products and services, geographical areas, and main 
customers. In essence, IFRS 8 requires the reporting of the same operating segment and entity-wide 
information as SFAS 131.6 The decision to adopt IFRS 8 was motivated by the IASB-FASB 
convergence agenda (IFRS 8, para. IN2). Despite the rationales provided by the IASB in favour of IFRS 
8 (including benefits of international harmonisation; users’ ability to see the enterprise through the eyes 
of the management; and evidence from US studies showing improved segment disclosures and value 
relevance of segmental data under SFAS 131), the adoption of the standard was met with opposition in 
Europe.7 In April 2007, the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
proposed a motion for a parliamentary resolution that expressed significant concerns about the adoption 
of IFRS 8 in Europe (The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 2007). The motion expressed 
concerns including: that IFRS 8 would import an alien standard (SFAS 131) into EU law; that IFRS 8 
was a move away from a regime which clearly defines how listed EU companies should define and 
report on segments, towards an approach that permits management itself to define operating segments 
as it finds suitable; and that disclosure of geographic information would be reduced compared to IAS 
14R.  
 
In their analysis of the comment letters received on IFRS 8’s exposure draft (ED 8), Crawford, Helliar, 
and Power (2013) find that preparers thought that the proposed standard would be more useful to users, 
but expressed concerns about the cost of information production and disclosure of proprietary 
information. On the other hand, users perceived a negative impact on them, and expressed concerns 
about the usefulness of segmental information under IFRS 8. Crawford et al. (2013) also argue that 
IFRS 8’s requirement to disclose information that has been prepared for internal decision making rather 
than external users is in conflict with the objective of the IASB’s conceptual framework, which gives 
primacy to existing and potential investors. In his September 2007 presentation to the Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament, Veron (2007) argues that the IASB’s decision 
to adopt IFRS 8 was a political one. He argues that since IFRS 8 does not require companies to disclose 
geographic segment information, investors believed that the purpose of IFRS 8 was to narrow 
differences between the US GAAP and IFRS, rather than to improve the quality of disclosure. Similar 
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criticism was voiced in the UK, when in April 2007, 36 members of the UK Parliament submitted a 
Parliamentary Motion urging the UK government and the European Commission to carry out an urgent 
and comprehensive assessment of IFRS 8 (Mitchell, 2007). Concerns were also raised in the financial 
press. Critics of the standard put pressure on the European Parliament, which instructed the European 
Commission to conduct a thorough impact assessment of IFRS 8 before it was prepared to act on final 
endorsement (Zeff, 2008). Eventually, IFRS 8 was endorsed and superseded IAS 14R. It became 
effective for financial years commencing on or after 1 January 2009.  
 
Nichols, Street, and Tarca (2013) summarise the results of the most recent studies on the impact of 
IFRS 8 in different countries, and conclude that while IASB anticipated an increase in the number of 
reported segments following the adoption of the standard, the majority of companies did not change the 
number of segments. Moldovan (2014) examines a sample of 400 European multi-segment companies 
in the first year of IFRS 8 adoption and documents inconsistencies with which companies disclose their 
segmental and entity-wide information in the notes to financial statements relative to other corporate-
level communications (e.g., press releases, corporate websites, webcasts, etc.). However, research on 
the impact of IFRS 8 implementation is still in its infancy. Research into the impact of IFRS 8 on 
companies in the UK is limited to a report by Crawford et al. (2012), in which they compare segment 
reporting during the last year of IAS 14R (2008) and the first year of IFRS 8 (2009) implementation.8 
They also interview a small sample of users, preparers and auditors to gather opinions on whether IFRS 
8 provided more decision-useful information than IAS 14R. Crawford et al. (2012) find that while the 
number of segments increased, the line items per segment on average decreased.9 However, their 
analysis only covers the latest segment regime change. In contrast, our study employs a longer-term 
framework and compares segment reporting practices under all three segment reporting regimes. This 
helps to achieve a better understanding of how segment disclosure in the UK has changed with the move 
to a management approach in segment reporting. In addition to analysing the impact of changes in 
segment reporting standards on geographic vs. business line disclosures, we focus explicitly on the 
provision of segment profit data, given the importance of corporate performance for investors and 
analysts (AIMR, 1993; PwC, 2007). 
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Segment disclosure literature reveals the trade-off between the benefits and costs of segment disclosure 
regulation for companies (e.g., Leuz, 2004). The benefits include reduction in information asymmetry, 
which can lower companies’ cost of capital (i.e., capital-market considerations). Segment disclosure 
regulations are primarily motivated by such capital-market considerations. Had there been no disclosure 
costs, full disclosure of information should prevail. However, extant disclosure literature demonstrates 
that proprietary cost (i.e., disadvantages associated with disclosure of competitively sensitive 
information) is the key factor that deters companies from full disclosure, as companies are found to be 
reporting segments in line with their proprietary cost incentives (Harris, 1998; Leuz, 2004; Ettredge et 
al., 2006; Berger and Hann, 2007). In a UK survey of corporate managers’ disclosure attitudes, Gray 
and Robers (1988) report that segment disclosures are perceived as among the most highly sensitive 
items, and that managers’ assessment critically depends on the level of segment aggregation. In a US 
survey of corporate managers, Smiley (1988) finds that 79% of corporate managers use the masking of 
a division’s profitability as the most frequent strategy for deterring entry by competitors. André et al. 
(2014) study segment disclosure choices of 270 companies from 17 EU countries in the first year of 
IFRS 8 adoption, and show that proprietary concerns are important, and solved in different ways – either 
by not following the standard’s suggestions for disclosure quantity, or by applying discretion in 
operating segment aggregation. The proprietary cost hypothesis, attributed to Verrecchia (1983) and 
later becoming known as proprietary cost theory, hinges on the premise that full disclosure of 
information may be costly for the disclosing entities as it may reveal commercially sensitive information 
to competitors and disadvantage the entity’s business. Because proprietary cost is potentially the main 
significant cost that influences companies’ segmental disclosure decisions, we use PCT as our main 
conceptual framework for rationalising and interpreting the segment disclosure choices that our sample 
companies have been making across the three segment reporting regimes. 10 
 
3. Research questions  
While the discussion in the preceding section demonstrates that the intent of each new standard was to 
improve segment disclosures, the extent to which changes in segment reporting standards improved the 
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disclosure practices of companies is an empirical question. Research on segment reporting under US 
GAAP is extensive, and much empirical evidence exists with regard to the actual impact of SFAS 14 
vs. SFAS 131. However, less is known about the relative impact of each of the three successive 
standards (SSAP 25 vs. IAS 14R vs. IFRS 8) on UK listed companies. 
 
Our study provides a comprehensive empirical assessment of the extent and nature of the impact of all 
three standards on segment disclosure practices in the UK. The following research questions (RQs) are 
addressed in this study: 
RQ1. To what extent did each successive standard – SSAP 25, IAS 14R and IFRS 8 – affect the 
number of business and geographic segments reported by UK companies? 
RQ2. To what extent did the adoption of each successive standard affect the level of specificity with 
which geographic areas are defined (e.g., specific country or countries, broader regions or 
continents)? 
RQ3. To what extent did each successive standard affect the type and volume of segmental 
accounting information disclosed?  
We next discuss the research design and sample employed to answer the research questions. 
 
4. Sample and method 
Segment reporting data on UK public companies is hand-collected from the notes to the financial 
statements of the respective companies’ published annual reports. The annual reports were obtained 
from the Perfect Information Filings database or downloaded from the companies’ websites. Our 
analysis is based on seven years of data during the 2002 to 2010 period. The sample period covers the 
last three years of the SSAP 25 era (2002 through 2004), three years of the IAS 14R era (years 2006 
through 2008) and one year (2010) of the IFRS 8 era. We exclude 2005 and 2009 from the analysis 
given that these are transition years, with different companies reporting under different standards. The 
sample consists of non-financial companies that were constituents of the FTSE 100 index at least once 
during the 2002-2010 period. To ensure that any observed changes in companies’ segment reporting 
practices over time are not driven by changes in sample composition, we restrict our sample to firms 
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for which we have data for each of the seven years of analysis. Our analysis is therefore based on a 
balanced sample of 127 companies per year, giving a total of 889 firm-year observations.11 
 
While LOB and geographic segmentation is required under SSAP 25 and IAS 14R, IFRS 8 requires 
reporting of operating segments, and does not specify whether these should be based on lines of 
business or geography. As stated in IFRS 8 (paragraph 5), operating segments are those components of 
a company whose operating results are regularly reviewed by the entity’s chief operating decision maker 
and for which discrete financial information is available. In addition, entity-wide disclosures are 
required (IFRS 8, paragraphs 31-34), which should include information on geographic areas, products 
and services, and major customers. 
 
As discussed by Crawford et al. (2012, pp. 7-8), there is “a great deal of confusion among the 
respondents about the new category of ‘entity-wide disclosures’ which were mandated under IFRS 8. 
Users, in particular, either did not know what these were or equated them with geographic disclosures 
which had previously been provided as segment data under IAS 14R”. Consequently, Crawford et al. 
(2012) treat entity-wide disclosures under IFRS 8 as equivalent to secondary segments under IAS 14R. 
When collecting our data, it similarly became apparent that a large proportion of our sample companies 
simply reported as entity-wide disclosures what had previously been reported as secondary segments 
under IAS 14R. More specifically, the secondary LOB segments reported under IAS 14R formed the 
basis for the reporting of products and services entity-wide information under IFRS 8 and, similarly, 
the secondary geographic segments disclosed under IAS 14R were usually translated into ‘geographic 
areas’ disclosed as entity-wide information under IFRS 8. 
  
For example, in 2008 (under IAS 14R), HomeServe Plc reported four primary geographic segments 
(UK Emergency Services; UK Policy Membership; USA; Continental Europe) and two secondary LOB 
segments (Provision of repair services; Sale of home assistance & emergency policies), and in 2010 
(under IFRS 8), the company reported the four geographic segments as ‘operating’ segments and the 
LOB segments as entity-wide ‘product & services’ disclosures. Similarly, in 2008, Antofagasta Plc 
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reported seven primary LOB segments and 13 geographic secondary segments, and in 2010 ‘translated’ 
the seven LOB segments into ‘operating’ segments, and nine of the 13 geographic segments into entity-
wide disclosure of geographic areas.  
 
To account for the preparers’ and users’ tendency to treat entity-wide disclosures as segments, we 
compute and report two alternative measures (‘narrow’ and ‘broad’) of the number of segments reported 
under IFRS 8. Under the ‘narrow’ measure, only the reported operating segments are counted as 
segments. Under the ‘broad’ measure, in addition to the reported operating segments, the entity-wide 
(geographic and products/services) disclosures are also treated as segments, as follows: 
(i)  if the nature of the reported operating segments is line-of-business, both the operating segments 
and any products/services reported under entity-wide disclosure are treated as LOB segments.12 
Any geographic locations reported under entity-wide disclosure are treated as geographic 
segments. 
(ii)  if the nature of the reported operating segments is geographic, both the operating segments and 
any geographic locations reported under entity-wide disclosure are treated as geographic 
segments. Any products/services reported under entity-wide disclosure are treated as LOB 
segments. 
 
Using the example of Antofagasta Plc, under the narrow measure the company would report seven LOB 
segments and no geographic segments. Under the broad measure, we add the four products/services 
reported in entity-wide disclosures to the LOB segments, giving a total of 11, while the nine geographic 
areas are treated as geographic segments. We fully acknowledge that entity-wide disclosures are strictly 
speaking not segments. Our treatment of entity-wide disclosures as segments, under our broad 
categorisation, may result in some over-estimation of the number of segments, to the degree that there 
is overlap between the business operating segments and products/services disclosed in entity-wide 
disclosures. However, a narrow approach, focusing only on formal segments, may be too restrictive, as 
the majority of companies appear to treat entity-wide disclosures as equivalent to what were secondary 
segments under IAS 14R. We therefore use both the narrow and broad approaches in our analysis.  
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The first research question (RQ1) implies a method of counting and comparing the number of segments 
across different segment types and reporting standards. We compare the changes that occurred during 
periods when there was no change in segment regime with those that occurred during periods when the 
segment reporting standard changed. The four periods are: 
1.  The SSAP 25 period: year 2002 vs. 2004 
2.  The SSAP 25 to IAS 14R changeover period: year 2004 vs. 2006 
3.  The IAS 14R period: year 2006 vs. 2008 
4.  The IAS 14R to IFRS 8 changeover period: year 2008 vs. 2010 
 
To address RQ2, regarding the impact of successive standards on how companies define their 
geographic areas, the disclosed geographic area names are classified into the following five categories, 
according to how narrowly the geographic areas are identified: 
1.  Specific single-country segments (e.g., ‘UK’, ‘France’, etc.) 
2.  Specific two-country segments (e.g., ‘UK and Ireland’, ‘USA and Canada’, etc.) 
3.  Specific single-region or single-continent segments (e.g., ‘Continental Europe’, ‘Rest of 
Europe’, etc.)  
4.  Specific two-or-more-regions or two-or-more-continents segments (e.g., ‘Middle East and 
Africa’, ‘Africa, Asia, Australasia and Other America’, etc.). This also includes segment names 
that represent a combination of a country and a region/continent that does not include that 
country (e.g., ‘Asia and USA’, etc.) 
5.  Rest of the world segments. This includes segments whose names include unidentifiable 
geographic locations (e.g., ‘Rest of World’, ‘Other international’, etc.) 
 
To address RQ3, regarding the extent to which each successive standard affected the type and volume 
of segmental accounting information disclosed, we measure the overall volume of segmental accounting 
information disclosed by a firm as the total number of all segmental accounting line items disclosed for 
all reported segments. Under the narrow approach, we only count the accounting line items on operating 
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segments under IFRS 8, while under the broad approach we also include the accounting line items in 
the entity-wide disclosures. The total number of reported segmental accounting line items categorised 
by type (e.g., sales, assets, profits) is our measure of the volume of that type of segmental accounting 
information disclosed by companies.13 
 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Changes in the number of segments reported 
To address RQ1, we first examine the impact of each successive standard on the number of segments 
reported per firm. Table 1 reports the average number of total, LOB and geographic segments disclosed 
by firms in each year. 14   
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Data in the upper panel of Table 1 show that across all three standards about half of all disclosed 
segments were geographic and half were LOB. The average total number of segments reported per firm 
during the IAS 14R period varied between 7.2 and 7.3, which is marginally (but not statistically 
significantly) higher than the total number of segments reported under SSAP 25 (between 7.0 and 7.2 
per firm). Similarly, there were no statistically or economically significant differences between SSAP 
25 and IAS 14R periods in terms of geographic and LOB segment numbers. However, there was a sharp 
and statistically significant reduction in the overall number of reported segments, from 7.2 in 2008, 
under IAS 14R, to 4 in 2010, under IFRS 8. There was a marked and statistically significant reduction 
in the number of LOB segments, from 3.5 in 2008 to 2.9 in 2010, and a more dramatic reduction in 
geographic segments, from 3.7 in 2008 to just 1.1 in 2010. Thus, we document evidence which seems 
to be in sharp contrast with that summarised and reported in IASB’s post-implementation review of 
IFRS 8, which states “Our review of academic research confirmed that although the number of reported 
segments did not change in many jurisdictions, when the number of reported segments did change, the 
number generally increased.” (IASB, 2013, p. 6).  
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While it is plausible that IFRS 8 had a differential impact on the number of segments in different 
jurisdictions, another reason is that the academic papers reviewed and summarised in the PIR and the 
research review by Nichols et al. (2013) provided little if any articulation on how they interpreted the 
entity-wide disclosure (e.g., Crawford et al., 2012). Indeed, under our broad measure of segment count, 
which treats entity-wide disclosures as segments, our results become consistent with those summarised 
in the PIR. More specifically, our broad measure of segment count would result in a large and 
statistically significant increase in the average number of segments per firm, to 8.8 (in 2010, under IFRS 
8), with LOB and geographic segments increasing to 4.3 and 4.5, respectively. 
 
Further analysis (middle and lower panels of Table 1) reveals systematic and statistically significant 
differences in the number of reported geographic, LOB and total segments between firms, with LOB 
vis-à-vis geography as the primary basis of segmentation under IAS 14R.15 The 29 firms (23% of the 
sample) with geography as the primary basis under IAS 14R reported significantly lower numbers of 
total and LOB segments across all three reporting regimes than did the 98 firms (77% of the sample) 
with LOB as the primary basis of segmentation. 
 
Because of somewhat ambiguous wording of the guiding principles of segmentation (such as reference 
to the internal organisational and reporting structure) in the IAS 14R standard, firms had some leeway 
in determining their basis of segmentation. The fact that 77% of firms used LOB and only 23% used 
geography as the primary basis could suggest that the majority of companies were less inclined to 
disclose comprehensive geographic data than LOB data.16 Recall that IAS 14R required the disclosure 
of a substantially greater volume of accounting information for primary segments than secondary 
segments. This reporting behaviour could be rationalised through the lens of the Proprietary Costs 
Theory, if one assumes that geographic financial data that reveals performance at specific geographic 
locations is perceived by companies to be more commercially sensitive than LOB financial data. A 
potential proprietary cost is any possible reduction in future benefit attributable to a disclosure. 
Disclosure of accounting data about a company may be useful to competitors and investors in a way 
which is harmful to a company’s prospects even if (or because) the information is favourable 
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(Verrecchia, 1983). Managers face a trade-off between proprietary costs and investors’ adverse reaction 
to limited disclosures by companies, and, according to Scott (1994), exercise discretion by comparing 
the costs of disclosing proprietary information against the anticipated reduction in company value 
resulting from investors’ perceptions about what may be hidden. Indeed, disclosure of detailed financial 
information on specific geographic operations could compromise the company’s competitive position 
in the given location and also alert various national tax authorities to regions with particularly high (or 
low) profitability. 
 
Overall, these results indicate that while the adoption of IAS 14R had no real impact on the number of 
LOB, geographic or total segments reported per firm, the impact of IFRS 8 depends on the treatment of 
entity-wide disclosures. Compared to SSAP 25 and IAS 14R periods, IFRS 8 did result in a substantial 
and statistically significant decrease (increase) in the number of segments under the narrow (broad) 
definition of segments. There are also persistent and significant differences in the number of segments 
between the primary-in-geography vis-à-vis primary-in-LOB firms. Results also suggest that the UK 
companies are more cautious about reporting a segmental organisational structure that would require 
disclosure of detailed financial information on geographic segments. 
 
5.2. Changes in the level of specificity of geographic segments 
This section addresses the second research question (RQ2) and examines the impact of the successive 
standards on the level of specificity of the reported geographic segments/areas. Firms have discretion 
in determining the degree of specificity of geographic segments or areas for reporting purposes. On the 
one hand, excessive aggregation of heterogeneous geographic areas into one reportable geographic 
segment or area reduces the level of detail of geographic information and may reduce the usefulness of 
this information for investors. On the other hand, the more specific the definition of a reported 
geographic segment is (e.g., a specific country), potentially the more prejudicial to the firm’s business 
the disclosure of such segmental data is likely to be. Table 2 shows the levels of specificity of 
geographic segments reported under each successive standard.  
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Table 2 about here 
 
The results for the entire sample (see upper panel of Table 2) show that across all reporting standards, 
the vast majority of the reported geographic segments and areas were defined in broader than single-
country terms. Across all regimes, only about a quarter of the reported geographic segments were 
defined in single-country terms. Single-country segments accounted for 27-30% of geographic 
segments reported during the SSAP 25 and IAS 14R periods, and 24% under IFRS 8. Under our broad 
approach, the reported single-country segments and areas account for 43% of all segment and entity-
wide geographic areas reported. This seems to suggest that while the adoption of IAS 14R did not result 
in any notable changes in the level of specificity of the reported geographic segments, IFRS 8 increased 
the disclosure of single-country segments and areas, if one adopts the broad approach. These findings 
are consistent with those of Nichols et al. (2012) for Continental European companies. However, the 
data in the two rightmost columns of Table 2 suggest that the increase in specificity amongst our sample 
firms was driven entirely by IFRS 8’s entity-wide disclosure requirements for domestic and individual 
material foreign countries. Importantly, the results in the middle and lower panels of the table show that 
the increased disclosure of single-country areas only occurs in firms that used LOB as the primary basis 
of segmentation under IAS 14R (or continued to use LOB as their operating segments under IFRS 8). 
More specifically, the percentage of single-country segments reported by primary-in-LOB firms 
increased marginally upon the adoption of IAS 14R, and there was a more substantial increase of entity-
wide single-country areas reported under IFRS 8 (see middle panel of Table 2).  
 
Opposite patterns are observed in primary-in-geography firms and firms that used geography as their 
operating segments under IFRS 8 (see lower panel of Table 2). That is, IAS 14R resulted in a major 
reduction in reported single-country segments, from about 30% during SSAP 25 to less than 20% during 
the IAS 14R and IFRS 8 periods.  
 
The above patterns reveal that companies choose to reduce the disclosure of single-country geographic 
segments, and increase the disclosure of multi-country segments, when standards require disclosure of 
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a substantially greater amount of accounting information per reportable geographic segment. Notably, 
this change in disclosure pattern occurred only upon the transition to IAS 14R (and remained unchanged 
upon transition to IFRS 8), which requires a much greater range of accounting data items to be disclosed 
per reported primary segment (and operating segments under IFRS 8) than what was required under 
SSAP 25.  
 
This disclosure behaviour echoes the concerns of investors summarised in the IASB’s post-
implementation review: “some investors are wary of a segmentation process that is based on the 
management perspective… [and] mistrust management’s intentions and sometimes think that segments 
are reported in such a way as to obscure the entity’s true management structure (often as a result of 
concerns about commercial sensitivity) or to mask loss-making activities within individual segments” 
(IASB, 2013, p. 5). Accordingly, this disclosure behaviour can be rationalised through the Proprietary 
Cost Theory. The increased disclosure requirement of accounting items for primary and operating 
segments under IAS 14R and IFRS 8 increases the risk of disclosure of segment-level proprietary 
information. The more specific the reported geographic segments are, the higher the companies’ risk 
(and cost) of proprietary information disclosure. To reduce the increased risk of proprietary information 
disclosure under IAS 14R’s and IFRS 8’s increased disclosure requirements (while remaining compliant 
with the standards’ requirements for more accounting information per segment), companies opt for 
more broadly-defined geographic segments. 
 
This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Armitage and Marston’s (2008) interviews with UK 
finance directors. They found that there is certain information that companies in general do not want to 
disclose because it is too useful to competitors, including “...details of performance by business 
segment, subsidiary or country...” (Armitage and Marston, 2008, p. 328). 
 
Overall, these results suggest that the majority of reported geographic segments are defined by firms in 
broadly aggregated geographic terms, and that the tendency of doing so after the introduction of IAS 
14R and then IFRS 8 increased (decreased) among those firms that adopted geography (LOB) as the 
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primary basis of segmentation. 
 
5.3 Volume of segmental accounting information 
Research question 3 (RQ3) addresses the impact of each successive standard on the volume of disclosed 
segmental accounting information.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Categories 1 to 6 and 11 (and Categories 1 to 11) of Table 3 show the volume of different types of 
mandatory accounting information disclosed during the SSAP 25 (IAS 14R and IFRS 8) period. 
(accounting information disclosure requirements are summarised in the Appendix). Category 12 
captures the volume of non-mandatory accounting information, and Category 13 shows the total volume 
of disclosed accounting information (sum total of Categories 11 and 12).  
 
Overall, the results in Table 3 show that the amount of mandatory (Category 11) and the total amount 
(Category 13) of accounting information was higher during the IAS 14R and IFRS 8 periods than the 
SSAP 25 period. There are, however, marked differences across individual categories of information 
and the three periods. The conclusions for the IFRS 8 period also depend on whether the narrow or 
broad approach is used. Using the narrow approach (which only accounts for accounting information 
disclosed for operating segments), it would appear that IFRS 8 reduces disclosure volume of mandatory 
and total accounting information, relative to the IAS 14R levels, while the opposite is true if the broad 
measure is used.  
 
For parsimony, hereafter we only summarise the findings about the most value-relevant and important, 
from investors’ perspective, types of segmental accounting information: sales (Category 1 in Table 3), 
assets (Category 3) and profits (Category 5).17  
 
Segmental Sales (Category 1). Using the narrow approach, it would appear that IFRS 8 is associated 
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with disclosure of the lowest, across the three standards, amount of LOB and geographic segment sales 
information. More of this type of information was disclosed during the IAS 14R period, and even more 
during the SSAP 25 period. However, the opposite result is observed if the broad approach is used 
(which also accounts for accounting information in entity-wide disclosures), with the highest volume 
of sales information under IFRS 8. Overall, it appears that IAS 14R and, to a greater extent, IFRS 8 
provided investors with a lower amount of segmental sales information than SSAP 25. The extent of 
the reduction in the amount of per-firm segmental sales information was particularly dramatic for the 
geographic dimension: from 5.1 under SSAP 25 to 1.4 under IAS 14R and 1.1 under IFRS 8. When 
incorporating information in the entity-wide disclosures, the amount of geographic sales information 
reported under IFRS 8 is similar, if marginally higher, to that reported by UK companies under SSAP 
25.  
 
Segmental Assets (Category 3). Under the narrow approach, IFRS 8 results in a substantially lower 
amount of disclosed segmental assets data (both on LOB and, even more so, on geographic segments) 
compared to the amounts disclosed during the IAS 14R and SSAP 25 periods. However, under the broad 
approach, the conclusions are different, with the largest amount of asset information disclosed during 
the IFRS 8 period. These patterns are almost identical to those of sales, as discussed above.  
 
Segmental Profit (Category 5). The adoption of IAS 14R had a major detrimental impact on the 
disclosure of segmental profit data; this did not improve with the adoption of IFRS 8. Companies 
disclosed three times more geographic profit information under SSAP 25 than they did under IAS 14R 
and IFRS 8. As profit data are not reported in entity-wide disclosures, the number of profit line items is 
very similar whether we adopt the narrow or broad definition of segments under IFRS 8. IFRS 8 and 
IAS 14R also resulted in a small decrease in the volume of LOB segmental profit information. Similar 
patterns are observed with regard to the volume of Profit and loss in associates data (Column 6). 
Overall, IAS 14R and IFRS 8 are associated with a major decrease in the volume of segmental profit 
information, which was particularly acute for the geographic dimension. 
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While our results show that the total amount of segmental accounting information disclosed under IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 substantially exceeded that disclosed under SSAP 25, this may not necessarily imply 
informational benefits to investors, as different segmental accounting data items may be of different 
levels of importance to investors. Information that allows investors to evaluate the 
performance/profitability of individual segments would be more important to them than other segmental 
accounting information. Table 4 shows the volume of profitability data that investors would be able to 
generate using the reported segmental data. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Results in Table 4 show that both IAS 14R and IFRS 8 resulted in major reductions in the volume of 
segment profitability information, compared to that under SSAP 25. While investors would have been 
able to compute on average six segmental profit margin data items per firm under SSAP 25, upon the 
adoption of IAS 14R and then IFRS 8 this dropped to less than four, as profit data does not have to be 
disclosed for secondary segments under IAS 14R or as part of IFRS 8’s entity-wide disclosures. 
Therefore, while profit margins could be computed for over 90% of reported segments under SSAP 25, 
under IAS 14R this could be done for approximately 60% of segments. Treating entity-wide disclosures 
as if they are segments (the broad approach) results in a further reduction in the proportion of segments 
for which profit margin can be calculated under IFRS 8, to 54%. The decline in the volume of 
profitability information is even more dramatic for geographic segments. The number of profit margin 
data items per firm decreased from around three during the SSAP 25 period to approximately one during 
the IAS 14R and IFRS 8 periods. Similarly, the percentage of geographic segments for which investors 
could compute profitability dropped from over 80% under SSAP 25 to 25% under IAS 14R, and to 20% 
under IFRS 8. 
 
Overall, IAS 14R and IFRS 8 clearly surpass SSAP 25 both in terms of the number of segments reported 
and the volume of segmental accounting information disclosed by UK firms. However, both IAS 14R 
and IFRS 8 resulted in major decreases in the volume of information on segmental performance – 
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arguably one of the most important types of segmental information for investors. This loss was 
particularly acute for the geographic dimension. The relative merit of IFRS 8 and IAS 14R as compared 
to SSAP 25, from users’ perspective, is therefore questionable. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Segment reporting requirements for listed UK companies changed twice in the last decade – from SSAP 
25 to IAS 14R upon the adoption of International Accounting Standards in 2005, and again in 2009, 
when IFRS 8 superseded IAS 14R. SSAP 25, IAS 14R and IFRS 8 differ significantly in the underlying 
principle of segment identification, the types of segments required for reporting and the types and 
quantity of accounting data items to be reported per segment. There were also differences in regulators’ 
motivations behind the introduction of each standard: the adoption of SSAP 25 was primarily motivated 
by users’ need for a greater volume and better quality of segmental information, while the adoption of 
IAS 14R and, to a larger extent, IFRS 8 was arguably more politically motivated, and aimed at 
international harmonisation of reporting rules.  
 
This study critically evaluates the merits of IFRS 8 relative to its two predecessors, IAS 14R and SSAP 
25, through a longitudinal analysis of segment report disclosures for a sample of 127 large listed UK 
companies under the three reporting standard regimes. We analyse the impact of each standard on the 
types, number and nature of segments disclosed, and the types and amount of accounting information 
disclosed by companies in their segment reports. Our study complements the generic findings and 
conclusions of the IASB’s IFRS 8 Post-Implementation Review (PIR) with new evidence from the UK, 
and offers new evidence to inform IASB’s policy making. 
 
In sharp contrast with the conclusions of the PIR, we find that IFRS 8 resulted in a major reduction in 
the average number of operating segments, relative to both the IAS 14R and SSAP 25 levels. We suggest 
that this paradox may be due to how different studies treat IFRS 8’s entity-wide disclosures. Some of 
the studies summarised in the PIR treat IFRS 8’s entity-wide disclosures as if they are equivalent to 
secondary segments under IAS 14R. While such treatment is not consistent with the wording of the 
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standard (i.e., entity-wide disclosures are not segments), the approach may have some empirical merit. 
Indeed, we find that a large proportion of our UK sample firms used their IAS 14R secondary segments 
as a template for entity-wide disclosures of geographic areas and/or products and services, under IFRS 
8. While our research design cannot offer insights into factors that drive companies’ disclosure 
decisions, we conjecture that this disclosure pattern could be due to a number of factors.  
 
First, the secondary LOB or geographic segments reported under IAS 14R were not actual (but rather 
‘artificial’) segments, and preparers moved this information into entity-wide disclosures upon the 
transition to IFRS 8. Second, preparers lacked clear understanding of the nature of entity-wide 
disclosures and interpreted this as secondary segment-type disclosure. Third, to minimise information 
production costs, preparers chose to use the previously reported secondary segments as a blueprint for 
entity-wide disclosures. Adopting a broad approach to segment definition, similar to that adopted by 
prior studies discussed in the PIR, we find that the introduction of IFRS 8 has resulted in a significant 
increase in the number of segments. The overall quantity of accounting information disclosed in 
segment reports is also substantially higher under IFRS 8 and IAS 14R than SSAP 25.  
 
However, while the total volume of segment information increased with the introduction of each new 
standard, both IFRS 8 and IAS 14R are associated with a major reduction (compared to the SSAP 25 
levels) in the quantity of disclosure of segmental profit information for line of business (LOB) and even 
more notably for geographic segments. While segment-level performance data may arguably be the 
most important accounting information type for investors, companies appear to be reluctant to provide 
such information – possibly for proprietary cost reasons. Importantly, the reduction in disclosure of 
segmental profit information occurred upon the transition from SSAP 25 to IAS 14R (as no profit data 
had to be reported for secondary segments), while there were only small differences between the IAS 
14R and IFRS 8 levels (even if one includes the entity-wide disclosures in the analysis). It is, therefore, 
not surprising that studies that only compare information disclosure quantities under IAS 14R vs. IFRS 
8 do not observe this loss of geographic profit data. 
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Finally, we document evidence that the reported geographic operating segments (under IFRS 8) and 
geographic primary segments (under IAS 14R) tend to be more broadly defined compared to geographic 
secondary segments and geographic segments reported under IAS 14R and SSAP 25, respectively. This 
suggests that companies choose to use more broadly defined geographic areas when they are required 
to disclose more detailed accounting information (including profit data), which is consistent with the 
predictions of the Proprietary Costs Theory. Our findings on the geographic dimension complement 
similar findings on the LOB dimension in prior literature on the impact of competitive disadvantages 
on managers’ LOB segment reporting choices. 
 
Overall, our findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of IAS 14R and IFRS 8 in improving investors’ 
information environment. Despite the possible benefits (to investors) of the increased overall quantity 
of information disclosed under IFRS 8, and that IFRS 8 can help investors see companies through the 
eyes of management, SSAP 25 arguably better served investors’ needs for geographic information. 
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Appendix 
Brief summary of key features of SSAP 25, IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
SSAP 25 
(mandatory from 1991 to 2005) 
IAS 14R 
(mandatory from 2005 to 2009) 
IFRS 8 
(mandatory from 2009) 
Basis of segment identification and measurement of segment information 
Should reflect differences in risk, 
returns, growth rates and future 
potential 
 
 
 
10% materiality threshold applies 
Should reflect predominant 
sources of risk and returns, and 
have regard for the company’s 
operational divisions 
 
 
10% materiality threshold applies 
Management approach, i.e., based 
on how segments are determined 
internally and reported to (and 
reviewed by) chief operating 
decision maker (CODM) 
 
10% materiality threshold applies 
Segmental amounts must be 
reported on the same basis as the 
entity’s financial statements 
Segmental amounts must be 
reported on the same basis as the 
entity’s financial statements 
Segmental amounts are not 
required to conform with the basis 
of preparation and reporting of the 
entity’s financial statement 
Types of segments  
 Geographic  
 Line of Business (LOB) 
 
 
 Primary 
 Secondary 
 
If primary is based on geography, 
secondary should be based on 
LOB, and vice versa. 
 Operating segments 
Entity-wide disclosures 
None 
 
None  Geographic areas 
 Products & services 
 Major customers 
 
Entity-wide disclosures are not 
part of the management approach 
 
Accounting data to be disclosed 
For each segment: 
 Results 
 Revenues 
 Net assets 
 
If material and/or non-
prejudicial:  
 intersegment revenues 
 share of the profit/loss and 
assets of associates 
For primary segments: 
 External and intersegment 
revenues 
 Results 
 Assets 
 Liabilities 
 Capital expenditures 
 Depreciation and 
amortisation expense 
 Non-cash expenses other than 
depreciation and amortisation 
 Equity method and joint 
venture income 
 
For secondary segments: 
 Revenues 
 Assets 
 Capital expenditures 
 
For operating segments: 
 Profit/loss 
 Assets* 
 Liabilities* 
 Revenues* 
 Intersegment revenues* 
 Interest revenue/expense* 
 Depreciation and 
amortisation* 
 Share in the profit or loss of 
equity method associates* 
 Investment in equity method 
associates and joint ventures* 
 Other non-cash items* 
 Reconciliations to the entity’s 
amounts 
 
For entity-wide disclosures: 
For geographic areas:** 
 Revenues and non-current 
assets for (i) the country of 
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domicile and (ii) all other 
foreign countries in total 
 Revenues and non-current 
assets for material individual 
foreign countries 
 
For products & Services:** 
 Revenues 
 
For main customers: 
 Revenues 
* To be disclosed if such amounts are provided to or reviewed by CODM. ** Unless information is not available 
and the cost to develop it is excessive. 
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Notes 
1 Nichols et al. (2012) also discuss the debate surrounding the adoption of IFRS 8. 
2 Studies arguing for the importance of segment information include e.g., Mautz (1968), Roberts (1989), Boatsman 
et al. (1993), McConnell and Pacter (1995), Maines et al. (1997), Street et al. (2000), Herrmann and Thomas 
(2000), Bodnar et al. (2003), Paul and Largay (2005) and Veron (2007). 
3 Standards vary in their terminology regarding lines of business segments, from ‘classes of business’ in SSAP 25 
to business segments in IAS 14R and business activities in IFRS 8. As in prior literature (e.g., Street et al., 2000; 
Herrman and Thomas, 2000; Berger and Hann, 2003), we use LOB to refer to business segments. 
4 However, SFAS 14 also required the disclosure of depreciation, capital expenditures and equity in the net income 
and assets of associates for industry segments. 
5 A more detailed summary of the deliberations and processes that led to the issuance of IAS 14R can be found in 
Street and Nichols (2002).  
6 IFRS 8 only differs from SFAS 131 in that it does not require segment reporting in interim reports, it requires 
the reporting of segment liabilities (if this information is provided to management) and it defines segmental assets 
as “non-current assets”, which includes intangible assets. 
7 Crawford et al. (2013) point out that in informing its decision to converge with SFAS 131, the IASB used 
evidence from US studies showing that segment disclosures under SFAS 131 improved predictive accuracy and 
were quickly impounded into share prices. They point out at the problem of relying upon the US evidence on 
SFAS 131 vs. SFAS 14 as a proxy for IFRS 8 vs. IAS 14R analysis, because although the disclosure requirements 
of IFRS 8 and SFAS 131 are nearly identical, the requirements of IAS 14R are different from those of SFAS 14. 
8 Nichols et al. (2012) examine the impact of IFRS 8 in a sample of 14 European countries, not including the UK.  
9 Crawford et al. (2012) treat the IFRS 8 entity-wide disclosures as segments but do not discuss the reasons for 
doing so. Our study, however, demonstrates the rationale for treating the entity-wide disclosures as segments and, 
furthermore, reports two sets of results, with and without the entity-wide disclosures being treated as segments. 
10 Segment information production costs can be another factor, though this would not be the case for very large 
companies, which are the subject of our analysis, hence we do not consider this factor in our study. 
11 Although the 127 companies account for less than 25% of the total number of non-financial companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange, they account for close to 90% of the market capitalisation of all non-financial 
segment-reporting constituents of the FTSE All Share index. 
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12 The products/services areas reported under entity-wide disclosure are different from the reported business 
operating segments. There is, thus, no double counting when products/services areas are treated as segments under 
the broad approach. For example, Antofagasta PLC reports seven business operating segments (Los Pelambres, 
El Tesoro, Michilla, Esperanza, Exploration and evaluation, Railway and other transport services, and Water 
concession) and four products/services areas (Copper, Molybdenum, Silver and Gold). The company also reported 
nine geographic areas under entity-wide disclosures. 
13 Because line items of similar accounting substance may have different names under different standards, we 
group all segmental accounting line items into broadly defined categories that capture their accounting substance. 
For example, all segmental sales-related definitions (e.g., the sales by origin and sales by destination items of 
SSAP 25, the revenue from external customers item of IAS 14R and the revenues from external customers item 
of IFRS 8) are denoted as sales. 
14 The results for 2003 are very similar to those of 2002 and 2004 (SSAP 25 years), and those of 2007 are very 
similar to those of 2006 and 2008 (IAS 14R years). To simplify the tables, data for years 2003 and 2007 are not 
reported, but are available upon request.  
15 IAS 14R required the disclosure of a substantially greater volume of accounting information for primary 
segments than for secondary segments. 
16 An alternative explanation may be that the firms’ internal reporting and organisational structures tended to be 
organised along business lines rather than geographic dimensions. 
17 Valuation literature demonstrates that earnings (profit) and book value (assets) are the primary inputs in 
accounting-based valuation models, and analyst literature suggests that earnings, sales and assets are the most 
important accounting information types for analysts (Garrod and Rees, 1998; Breton and Taffler, 2001).  
 33 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to Gillian Maciver for help with the data collection. We are grateful to Clive 
Emmanuel, Claire Roberts, Vivien Beattie, Günther Gebhardt, Pauline Weetman, the editors and an 
anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to the participants 
at the 2013 European Accounting Association Congress (Paris), the 2013 British Accounting and 
Finance Association Conference (Newcastle) and the 2013 International Workshop on Accounting 
and Regulation (Siena) for their suggestions on the earlier versions of the paper. All errors are the 
sole responsibility of the authors. 
 
  
 34 
References 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) (1990) Statement of Standard Accounting Practice, No 25, 
Segmental Reporting, June, ASC: London. 
André, P., Filip, A., and Moldovan, R. (2013) The Interplay between Segment Disclosure Quantity and 
Quality. Retrieved from SSRN http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2470466  
Armitage, S., and Marston, C. (2008) Corporate disclosure, cost of capital and reputation: Evidence from 
finance directors, British Accounting Review, 40, pp. 314-336. doi:10.1016/j.bar.2008.06.003 
Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) (1993) Financial reporting in the 1990s 
and beyond: A position paper of the Association for Investment Management and Research, 
Prepared by Knutson, P. H., Charlottesville, VA. 
Berger, M., and Hann, R. (2003) The impact of SFAS 131 on information and monitoring, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 41, pp. 163-233. DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.00100 
Berger, M., and Hann, R. (2007) Segment Profitability and the Proprietary and Agency Costs of 
Disclosure, The Accounting Review, 82, pp. 869-906.  http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr.2007.82.4.869 
Boatsman, J., Behn, B., and Patz, D. (1993) A test of geographical segment disclosures, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 31, pp. 46-64. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2491163    
Bodnar, G., Tang, C., and Weintrop, J. (2003) The value of corporate international diversification, 
Working Paper, John Hopkins University. Retrieved from 
http://www.academia.edu/2892049/The_value_of_corporate_international_diversification  
Botosan, C., and Stanford, M. (2005) Managers’ motives to withhold segment disclosures and the effect 
of SFAS No. 131 on analysts’ information environment, The Accounting Review, 80, pp. 751-771. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093175  
Bouwman, M., Frishkoff, P., and Frishkoff, P. (1987) How do financial analysts make decisions? A 
process model of the investment screening decision, Accounting, Organisations and Society, 12, 
pp. 1-30.  doi:10.1016/0361-3682(87)90013-4 
 
 35 
Breton, G., and Taffler, R. (2001) Accounting information and analyst stock recommendation decisions: 
a content analysis approach, Accounting and Business Research, 31, pp. 91-101. 
DOI:10.1080/00014788.2001.9729604 
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (2007) European Parliament resolution of 14 
November 2007 on the draft Commission regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003 
adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) 8, concerning disclosure of operating segments. Retrieved from 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P6-TA-
2007-0526 
Companies Act (1985). London. 
Crawford, L., Extance, H., Helliar, C., and Power, D. (2012) Operating segments: The usefulness of IFRS 
8. ICAS Report. ICAS: Edinburgh. Retrieved from http://icas.org.uk/crawford/  
Crawford, L., Ferguson, J., Helliar, C., and Power, D. (2014) Control over accounting standards within 
the European Union: The political controversy surrounding the adoption of IFRS. Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 25, pp. 304-318. doi:10.1016/j.cpa.2013.03.001 
Crawford, L., Helliar, C., and Power, D. (2013) Stakeholder views on the usefulness of IFRS 8: did the 
IASB favour preparers? Working paper. 
Emmanuel, C., and Garrod, N. (1992) Segment Reporting: International Issues and Evidence. Prentice 
Hall-ICAEW. 
Emmanuel, C., and Garrod, N. (1994) Segmental reporting in the UK: How does SSAP 25 stand up to 
international comparison? The European Accounting Review, 2, pp. 547-562. 
DOI:10.1080/09638189400000035  
Emmanuel, C., and Garrod, N. (1999) On segment identification, relevance and comparability, Working 
paper 99/2, University of Glasgow. Retrieved from https://daedalus.lib.gla.ac.uk/retrieve/191/99-
2%5B1%5D.pdf 
Emmanuel, C., and Garrod, N. (2002) On the relevance and comparability of segmental data, Abacus, 38, 
pp. 215-234. DOI: 10.1111/1467-6281.00106 
 36 
Emmanuel, C., Garrod, N., McCallum, C., and Rennie, E. (1999) The impact of SSAP 25 and the 10% 
materiality rule on segment disclosure in the UK, British Accounting Review, 31, pp. 127-149. 
doi:10.1006/bare.1998.0090 
Ettredge, M., Kwon, Y., Smith, D., and Zarowin, P. (2005) The impact of SFAS No. 131 business segment 
data on the market’s ability to anticipate future earnings, The Accounting Review, 80, pp. 773-804. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4093176  
Ettredge, M., Kwon, Y., Smith, D., and Stone, M. (2006) The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-
segment Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms, Review of Accounting Studies, 
11, pp. 91-117. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-006-6397-
9#page-1  
European Communities (2002) Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, of 19 July 2002, on the application of international accounting standards. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (1976) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
14 – Financial Reporting for Segments of a Business Enterprise, Stamford. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) (1997) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 
131 – Disclosures About Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, Norwalk. 
Garrod, N., and Rees, W. (1998) International Diversification and Firm Value, Journal of Business 
Finance and Accounting, 25, pp. 1255-1281. DOI: 10.1111/1468-5957.00236 
Gray, S. and Roberts, C. (1988) Voluntary information disclosure and the British multinationals: 
Corporate perceptions of costs and benefits. In: Hopwood, A. G. (Ed.), International pressures for 
accounting change. London (Prentice Hall). 
Harris, M. (1998) The association between competition and managers’ business segment reporting 
decisions, Journal of Accounting Research, 36, pp. 111-128. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2491323  
Herrmann, D., and Thomas, W. (2000) An analysis of segmental disclosures under SFAS No. 131 and 
SFAS No. 14, Accounting Horizons, 14, pp. 287-302. Retrieved from 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=5&sid=5740b2
b0-0eaf-4788-a0e1-613b162a911c%40sessionmgr4002&hid=4101   
 37 
Hope, O-K., and Thomas, W. (2008) Managerial empire building and firm disclosure, Journal of 
Accounting Research, 46, pp. 591-626. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40058147  
Hope, O-K., Kang, T., Thomas, W., and Vasvari, F. (2008) Pricing and mispricing effects of SFAS 131, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 35, pp. 281-306. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-
5957.2007.02071.x  
Hussain, S. (2007) Any other suggestions? (segmental reporting), Accountancy, 140(1367), pp. 82-83. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (2006) International Financial Reporting Standard 8 
– Operating Segments, International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, January, 
London. 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (2013) Post-implementation Review: IFRS 8 
Operating Segments, Report and Feedback Statement, International Accounting Standards 
Committee Foundation, July, London. 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (1981) International Accounting Standard No. 
14: Reporting Financial Information by Segment, London. 
International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) (1997) International Accounting Standard No. 14 
(Revised): Segment Reporting, London. 
Leuz, C. (2004) Proprietary versus Non-Proprietary Disclosures: Evidence from Germany. In C. Leuz, D. 
Pfaff, and A. Hopwood (Eds.), The Economics and Politics of Accounting: International 
Perspectives on Research Trends, Policy and Practice. Oxford University Press (pp. 164-197). 
Maines, L., McDaniel, L., and Harris, M. (1997) Implications of proposed segment reporting standards 
for financial analysts’ investment judgements, Journal of Accounting Research, 35 (Supplement), 
pp. 1-24. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2491450  
Moldovan, R. (2014) Post-implementation reviews for IASB and FASB standards: a comparison of the 
process and findings for the operating segments standards, Accounting in Europe, 11, pp. 113-137. 
DOI:10.1080/17449480.2014.901588  
Mautz, K. (1968) Financial reporting by diversified companies. New York: Financial Executives 
Research Foundation. 
 38 
McConnell, P., and Pacter, P. (1995) IASC and FASB proposals would enhance segment reporting, CPA 
Journal, 65(8), pp. 32-39. Retrieved from 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1995/AUG95/F320995.htm  
Mitchell, A. (2007) Accountability of multinational companies, Parliamentary motion of 2007, April 27. 
Retrieved from http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2006-07/1369 
Nichols, N., and Street, D. (2007) The relationship between competition and business segment reporting 
decisions under the management approach of IAS 14 Revised, Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 16, pp. 51-68. doi:10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2007.01.002 
Nichols, N., Street, D., and Cereola, S. (2012) An analysis of the impact of adopting IFRS 8 on the 
segment disclosures of European blue chip companies, Journal of International Accounting, 
Auditing and Taxation, 21, pp. 79-105. doi:10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2012.07.001 
Nichols, N., Street, D., and Gray, S. (2000) Geographic segment disclosures in the United States: 
reporting practices enter a new era, Journal of International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 9, 
pp. 59-82. doi:10.1016/S1061-9518(00)00025-2 
Nichols, N., Street, D., and Tarca, A. (2013) The impact of segment reporting under the IFRS 8 and SFAS 
131 management approach: a research review, Journal of International Financial Management & 
Accounting, 24, pp. 261-312. DOI: 10.1111/jifm.12012 
Paul, J., and Largay, J. (2005) Does the “management approach” contribute to segment reporting 
transparency? Business Horizons, 48, pp. 303-310. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2004.10.017 
Prather-Kinsey, J., and Meek, G. (2004) The effect of revised IAS 14 on segment reporting by IAS 
companies, European Accounting Review, 13, pp. 213-234. DOI: 10.1080/0963818032000138206 
Prencipe, A. (2004) Proprietary Costs and Determinants of Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Evidence from 
Italian Listed Companies, European Accounting Review, 13, pp. 319-340. DOI: 
10.1080/0963818042000204742 
Previts, G., Bricker, R., Robinson, T., and Young, S. (1994) A Content Analysis of Sell-Side Financial 
Analyst Company Reports, Accounting Horizons, 8, pp. 55-70. Retrieved from 
http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=a753f68
3-fab6-430e-8c90-2106ee2e413e%40sessionmgr4001&hid=4101  
 39 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (2007, November) Corporate reporting: Is it what investment 
professionals expect? Report. Retrieved from http://www.pwc.no/no/ifrs/publikasjoner/corporate-
reporting.jhtml  
Roberts, C. (1989) Forecasting earnings using geographical segment data: some UK evidence, Journal of 
International Financial Management and Accounting, 1, pp. 130-151. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-
646X.1989.tb00007.x 
Smiley, R. (1988) Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence, Journal of Industrial Organization, 
6, pp. 167-180. doi:10.1016/S0167-7187(88)80023-7 
Scott, T. (1994) Incentives and Disincentives for Financial Disclosure: Voluntary Disclosure of Defined 
Benefit Pension Plan Information by Canadian Firms, The Accounting Review, 69, pp. 26-43. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/248259  
Street, D., and Nichols, N. (2002) LOB and geographic segment disclosures: an analysis of the impact of 
IAS 14 revised, Journal of International Accounting Auditing and Taxation, 11, pp. 91-113. 
doi:10.1016/S1061-9518(02)00072-1 
Street, D., Nichols, N., and Gray, S. (2000) Segment disclosures under SFAS No. 131: has business 
segment reporting improved? Accounting Horizons, 14, pp. 259-285. Retrieved from 
http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=90758f1
4-2740-4b45-9a8d-0981093b3623%40sessionmgr114&hid=101  
Sukhraj, P. (2007) Segment reporting row hots up. Retrieved from 
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/analysis/1782542/segment-reporting-row-hots 
Veron, N. (2007) EU adoption of the IFRS 8 standard on operating segments. Report to the Economic 
and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament. Retrieved from 
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publication-detail/publication/21-eu-adoption-of-the-ifrs-8-
standard-on-operating-segments/  
Verrecchia, R. (1983) Discretionary disclosure, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, pp. 179-194. 
Retrieved from  
http://www.personal.psu.edu/sjh11/ACCTG597E/Class21/notUsed/VerrecchiaJAE83.pdf   
 40 
Zeff, S. (2008) IFRS developments in the USA and EU, and some implications for Australia, Australian 
Accounting Review, 18, pp. 275-282. doi: 10.1111/j.1835-2561.2008.0032. 
  
 41 
Table 1. Number of segments reported during SSAP 25, IAS 14R and IFRS 8 
 SSAP 25 IAS 14R IFRS8 Statistical significance of change 
Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
2004 
vs. 
2002 
2006 
vs. 
2004 
2008 
vs. 
2006 
2010 
vs. 
2008 
2010 
vs. 
2004 
      
S
S
A
P
 2
5
 
S
S
A
P
 2
5
 v
s.
  
IA
S
 1
4
R
 
IA
S
 1
4
R
 
IA
S
 1
4
R
 v
s.
 
IF
R
S
 8
 
IF
R
S
 8
 
Total sample (127 firms) 
Average no. of all 
segments per firm 
7.17 6.98 7.31 7.22 
8.85†† 
4.05† 
- - - 
*** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
           
Average no. of 
geographic 
segments per firm 
3.56 3.6 3.65 3.7 
4.53†† 
1.13† 
- - - 
** 
*** 
*** 
*** 
           
Average no. of 
LOB segments per 
firm 
3.61 3.39 3.65 3.52 
4.32†† 
2.93† 
- - - 
** 
** 
*** 
** 
Firms with line-of-business (LOB) as primary basis under IAS 14R (98 firms) 
Average no. of all 
segments per firm 
7.58 7.43 7.8 7.57 
9.55†† 
4.07† 
- - - 
*** 
*** 
* 
*** 
           
Average no. of 
geographic 
segments per firm 
3.43 3.46 3.54 3.59 
4.43†† 
0.30† 
- - - 
*** 
*** 
** 
*** 
           
Average no. of 
LOB segments per 
firm 
4.15 3.97 4.26 3.98 
5.12†† 
3.77† 
- - - 
*** 
- 
* 
- 
Firms with geography as primary basis under IAS 14R (29 firms) 
Average no. of all 
segments per firm 
5.79 5.48 5.66 6.03 
6.48†† 
4.00† 
- - - 
- 
*** 
- 
*** 
           
Average no. of 
geographic 
segments per firm 
4 4.07 4.03 4.07 
4.86†† 
3.93† 
- - - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
           
Average no. of 
LOB segments per 
firm 
1.79 1.41 1.62 1.97 
1.62†† 
0.07† 
- - - 
- 
*** 
- 
*** 
The table reports the number of segments per firm per year, split between geographic and line-of-business (LOB) 
segments. The analysis covers the SSAP 25 (2002 and 2004), IAS 14R (2006 and 2008) and IFRS 8 (2010) periods. 
The significance of the change in the mean number of segments within reporting regimes (2004 vs. 2002 and 2008 
vs. 2006) and between regimes (2006 vs. 2004, 2010 vs. 2008 and 2010 vs. 2004) are calculated using differences 
in means t-test. The analysis is based on a sample of 127 non-financial companies for which we have data in each 
of the sample years. The sample companies were constituents of the FTSE 100 index at least once during the 2002-
2010 period. We exclude 2005 and 2009 as transition years from the analysis. For brevity, we do not report results 
for 2003 and 2007, but these are available on request. The top panel is based on the full sample of 127 companies, 
while in the middle and lower panels the analysis is split between firms with LOB and geography, respectively, as 
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the primary basis of segmentation under IAS 14R. For IFRS 8 the results are reported based on a narrow and broad 
interpretation of segments: † Under the narrow approach only the reported operating segments are treated as 
segments. †† Under the broad approach all of the entity-wide disclosures are also treated as segments. When the 
reported operating segments are LOB (i.e., there are no geographic operating segments), the geographic areas 
reported as entity-wide disclosures are treated and counted as geographic segments.  ***, ** and * indicate the 
statistical significance of the noted difference at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 2: Frequency of geographic segments reported at various levels of aggregation 
Year 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010†† 2010† 
 
Total sample (127 firms) 
Total number of geographic 
segments 
452 458 461 470 535 141 
Percentage in relation to total:       
Single-country segments 30.3% 28.4% 27.3% 28.5% 42.6% 24.1% 
Two-country segments 2.7% 3.3% 4.1% 4.3% 3.4% 9.2% 
Single-region segments 35.8% 37.8% 39.0% 36.0% 27.7% 36.9% 
Two-region segments 16.2% 16.2% 16.1% 17.9% 13.3% 17.7% 
Rest of World segments 15.0% 14.4% 13.4% 13.4% 13.1% 12.1% 
 
Firms with line-of-business (LOB) as primary basis under IAS 14R (98 firms) 
Total number of geographic 
segments 
336 337 346 349 414 25 
Percentage in relation to total:       
Single-country segments 28.9% 28.5% 30.3% 31.5% 49.8% 52.0% 
Two-country segments 2.4% 2.1% 2.9% 2.9% 1.7% 8.0% 
Single-region segments 36.0% 37.1% 36.7% 33.8% 24.2% 24.0% 
Two-region segments 17.6% 17.2% 15.9% 18.1% 11.4% 8.0% 
Rest of World segments 15.2% 15.1% 14.2% 13.8% 13.0% 8.0% 
 
Firms with geography as primary basis under IAS 14R (29 firms) 
Total number of geographic 
segments 
116 121 115 121 121 116 
Percentage in relation to total:       
Single-country segments 34.5% 28.1% 18.3% 19.8% 18.2% 18.1% 
Two-country segments 3.4% 6.6% 7.8% 8.3% 9.1% 9.5% 
Single-region segments 35.3% 39.7% 46.1% 42.1% 39.7% 39.7% 
Two-region segments 12.1% 13.2% 16.5% 17.4% 19.8% 19.8% 
Rest of World segments 14.7% 12.4% 11.3% 12.4% 13.2% 12.9% 
 
The table reports the distributions of geographic segments by the level of specificity of geographic areas. The 
sample and panels are as per Table 1 above. † The narrow approach as defined in Table 1. †† The broad approach 
as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Volume of segmental accounting information 
  
Categories of segmental accounting information 
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SSAP 25 
2002 Total 8.45 0.65 5.92 0.68 6.57 1.34 n/r n/r n/r n/r 23.61 13.74 37.35 
 Geographic 5.05 0.28 2.85 0.35 3.12 0.59 n/r n/r n/r n/r 12.23 5.39 17.61 
 LOB 3.40 0.37 3.07 0.33 3.46 0.75 n/r n/r n/r n/r 11.38 8.35 19.73 
2004 Total 8.40 0.61 6.02 0.63 6.45 1.31 n/r n/r n/r n/r 23.43 13.99 37.42 
 Geographic 5.14 0.31 2.94 0.32 3.17 0.61 n/r n/r n/r n/r 12.50 5.28 17.79 
 LOB 3.26 0.30 3.07 0.31 3.28 0.71 n/r n/r n/r n/r 10.92 8.71 19.63 
IAS 14R 
2006 Total 7.09 1.10 7.07 0.65 4.08 0.83 3.83 6.76 3.83 2.14 37.38 7.24 44.61 
 Geographic 1.25 0.28 1.26 0.20 0.87 0.20 0.83 1.24 0.80 0.38 7.31 0.79 8.09 
 LOB 5.83 0.82 5.81 0.46 3.21 0.62 3.00 5.52 3.03 1.76 30.07 6.45 36.52 
2008 Total 7.02 1.19 6.94 0.81 3.90 0.80 3.61 6.24 3.60 2.04 36.14 9.21 45.35 
 Geographic 1.39 0.24 1.34 0.27 0.93 0.24 0.88 1.23 0.85 0.51 7.87 1.16 9.03 
 LOB 5.63 0.95 5.60 0.54 2.97 0.56 2.72 5.02 2.75 1.53 28.27 8.06 36.32 
IFRS 8 
2010 †† Total 10.52 1.86 7.48 0.69 4.06 1.29 2.32 5.14 3.62 3.88 40.87 16.46 57.32 
 Geographic 5.69 0.34 5.04 0.24 1.12 0.33 0.61 2.64 0.91 1.09 18.02 6.88 24.90 
 LOB 4.83 1.52 2.44 0.45 2.94 0.96 1.71 2.50 2.71 2.79 22.85 9.57 32.43 
2010 † Total 3.96 1.86 3.26 0.69 3.97 1.29 2.32 3.29 3.62 3.88 28.14 12.90 41.04 
 Geographic 1.08 0.34 0.85 0.24 1.07 0.33 0.61 0.80 0.91 1.09 7.33 3.99 11.32 
 LOB 2.88 1.52 2.41 0.45 2.90 0.96 1.71 2.49 2.71 2.79 20.81 8.91 29.72 
 
The table reports the average number of segmental accounting line items (by accounting data type) reported by each company. Categories 1 through 10 
capture the accounting line items to be disclosed, when applicable, under each standard. Category 11 represents the total volume of mandatory accounting 
line items (sum of Categories 1-10). Category 12 captures all other reported non-mandatory accounting line items and Category 13 captures the total volume 
of all segmental accounting information (sum of Categories 11 & 12). Note that Categories 7 to 10 were not mandatory during the SSAP 25 period. The 
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disclosure requirements under each standard are summarised in the Appendix. † The narrow approach as defined in Table 1. †† The broad approach as defined 
in Table 1. 
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Table 4: Availability of segment-level profitability data 
 SSAP 25  IAS 14R  IFRS 8 
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Number of segments per firm with available PM and ROA data: 
PM             
Total 6.27 6.04 -  3.93 *** 3.76 -  3.92 *** - 
Geographic 2.97 2.97 -  0.84 *** 0.85 -  1.07 *** - 
LOB 3.30 3.07 -  3.09 - 2.91 -  2.85 - - 
              
ROA             
Total 5.91 5.82 -  3.83 *** 3.78 -  3.22 *** ** 
Geographic 2.86 2.90 -  0.83 *** 0.86 -  0.84 *** - 
LOB 3.05 2.92 -  2.99 - 2.92 -  2.38 ** * 
 
Percentage of segments with available PM and ROA data: 
PM             
Total 90% 90% -  60% *** 58% -  54% *** - 
Geographic 86% 85% -  24% *** 25% -  25% *** - 
LOB 93% 93% -  84% ** 80% -  74% *** - 
             
ROA             
Total 84% 86% -  58% *** 58% -  45% *** *** 
Geographic 83% 83% -  24% *** 25% -  20% *** - 
LOB 84% 88% -  82% - 80% -  63% *** *** 
PM refers to Profit Margin of reported segments, computed as the ratio of segment profit to turnover. ROA refers 
to Return on Asset of reported segments, computed as the ratio of the segment profit to assets. The top panel shows 
the per-firm average numbers of segments for which profitability can be calculated. It should be noted that profit 
data is not required for secondary segments under IAS 14R and for entity-wide disclosures under IFRS 8. The bottom 
panel is based on the ‘broad’ definition of segments (i.e., including entity-wide disclosures under IFRS 8) and shows 
the percentages of segments for which profitability data is available. ***, ** and * indicate the statistical significance 
of the noted difference at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 
